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LIBERAL THEORIES 
OF MULTICULTURALISM
The last ten years has seen a remarkable upsurge in interest 
amongst political philosophers in the rights of ethnocultural groups 
within Western democracies. Joseph Razʼs writings, particularly his 
article on Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, have played an 
important role in this debate. My aim in this paper is to give a (very) 
condensed overview of the philosophical debate so far, and to sug-
gest how Razʼs theory fi ts into the larger debate.
1. The First Stage: Multiculturalism as Communitarianism
I think we can distinguish three broad positions in the debate over 
multiculturalism or minority rights1. The fi rst position to emerge, and 
the one that dominated in the debate in the 1970s and 1980s, viewed 
multiculturalism as a form of, or application of, communitarianism. 
It was assumed that the debate over multiculturalism was therefore 
essentially equivalent to the debate between “liberals” and “commu-
1  I will use the term “minority rights” and “multiculturalism” interchangeably, to refer to a 
wide range of public policies, legal rights and constitutional provisions that relate to the accom-
modation of ethnocultural minorities. Common examples of such policies and laws in Western 
democracies include language rights and self-government powers for national minorities, multi-
cultural educational reforms and religious exemptions for immigrant groups, treaty rights and land 
claims for indigenous peoples. This is obviously a heterogeneous category, but the various measu-
res have two important features in common: (a) they go beyond the familiar set of common civil 
and political rights of individual citizenship which are protected in all liberal democracies; (b) 
they are adopted with the intention of recognizing and accommodating the distinctive identities 
and needs of ethnocultural groups. For a helpful typology, see J. Levy, “Classifying Cultural 
Rights”, in I. Shapiro-W. Kymlicka (eds.), Ethnicity and Group Rights, New York University 
Press, New York 1997, pp. 22-66. I should emphasize that many of the measures that I am de-
scribing as “minority rights” are not “rights” in Razʼs technical sense.
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nitarians” (or between “individualists” and “collectivists”). Confront-
ed with an unexplored topic like multiculturalism, it was natural, and 
perhaps inevitable, that political theorists would look for analogies 
with other, more familiar, topics, and the liberal-communitarian de-
bate seemed the most relevant and applicable.
The liberal-communitarian debate is an old and venerable one 
within political philosophy, going back several centuries, so I wonʼt 
try to rehearse it in its entirety. But to dramatically oversimplify, one 
strand of the debate revolves around the priority of individual free-
dom. Liberals insist that individuals should be free to decide on their 
own conception of the good life, and applaud the liberation of indi-
viduals from any ascribed or inherited status. Liberal individualists 
argue that the individual is morally prior to the community: the com-
munity matters only because it contributes to the well-being of the 
individuals who compose it. If those individuals no longer fi nd it 
worthwhile to maintain existing cultural practices, then the commu-
nity has no independent interest in preserving those practices, and no 
right to prevent individuals from modifying or rejecting them.
Communitarians dispute this conception of the “autonomous indi-
vidual”. They view individuals as “embedded” in particular social 
roles and relationships, rather than as agents capable of forming and 
revising their own conception of the good life. Rather than viewing 
group practices as the product of individual choices, they tend to 
view individuals as the product of social practices. Moreover, they 
often deny that the interests of communities can be reduced to the 
interests of their individual members. Privileging individual autono-
my is therefore seen as destructive of communities. A healthy com-
munity maintains a balance between individual choice and protection 
for the communal way of life, and seeks to limit the extent to which 
the former can erode the latter.
In this fi rst stage of the debate, the assumption was that oneʼs 
position on minority rights was dependent on, and derivative of, 
oneʼs position on the liberal-communitarian debate. That is, if one is 
a liberal who cherishes individual autonomy, then one will oppose 
minority rights as an unnecessary and dangerous departure from the 
proper emphasis on the individual. Communitarians, by contrast, 
view minority rights as an appropriate way of protecting communi-
ties from the eroding effects of individual autonomy, and of affi rm-
ing the value of community. Ethnocultural minorities in particular 
are worthy of such protection, partly because they are most at risk, 
but also because they still have a communal way of life to be pro-
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tected. Unlike the majority, ethnocultural minorities have not yet 
succumbed to liberal individualism, and so have maintained a cohe-
rent collective way of life.
This debate over the priority and reducibility of community inter-
ests to individual interests dominated the early literature on minority 
rights2. This interpretation of the debate was shared by both defen-
ders and critics of minority rights. Both sides agreed that in order to 
evaluate minority rights we needed to fi rst resolve these ontological 
and metaphysical questions about the relative priority of individuals 
and groups. Defenders of minority rights agreed that they were in-
consistent with liberalismʼs commitment to moral individualism and 
individual autonomy, but argued that this just pointed out the inher-
ent fl aws of liberalism.
In short, defending minority rights involved endorsing the com-
munitarian critique of liberalism, and viewing minority rights as de-
fending cohesive and communally-minded minority groups against 
the encroachment of liberal individualism.
2. The Second Stage: Multiculturalism Within a Liberal Framework
Partly as a result of Razʼs infl uential contributions, it has been 
increasingly recognized that this fi rst stage represented an unhelpful 
way to conceptualize most minority rights claims in western demo-
cracies. Equating minority rights with communitarianism seemed 
sensible at the time, but assumptions about the «striking parallel be-
tween the communitarian attack of philosophical liberalism and the 
notion of collective rights» have been increasingly questioned3.
There are two problems with this approach: fi rst, it misinterprets 
the nature of ethnocultural minorities; and second, it misinterprets 
the nature of liberalism.
2  For “communitarian” defenders of minority rights, see V. van Dyke, The Individual, the State, 
and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory, «World Politics», 29/3, 1977, pp. 343-69; R. Garet, 
Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, «Southern California Law Review», 56/5, 1983, 
pp. 1001-75; M. McDonald Should Communities Have Rights? Refl ections on Liberal Individual-
ism, «Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence», 4/2, 1991, pp. 217-37; D. Johnston, Native 
Rights as Collective Rights: A Question of Group Self-Preservation, «Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence», 2/1, 1989, pp. 19-34; A. Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism and the Rights of 
Ethnic Minorities, «Notre Dame Law Review», 67/3, 1992, pp. 615-76; D. Karmis, Cultures auto-
chtones et libéralisme au Canada: les vertus mediatrices du communautarisme libéral de Charles 
Taylor, «Canadian Journal of Political Science», 26/1, 1993, pp. 69-96; F. Svensson, Liberal Demo-
cracy and Group Rights: The Legacy of Individualism and its Impact on American Indian Tribes, 
«Political Studies», 27/3, 1979, pp. 421-39. For “individualist” critics, see J. Narveson, Collective 
Rights?, «Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence», 4/2: 3, 1991, pp. 29-45.
3  M. Galenkamp, Individualism and Collectivism: the concept of collective rights, Rotter-
damse Filosofi sche Studies, Rotterdam 1993, pp. 20-25. 
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In reality, most ethnocultural groups within Western democracies 
do not want to be protected from the forces of modernity unleashed 
in liberal societies. On the contrary, they want to be full and equal 
participants in modern liberal societies. This is true of most immi-
grant groups, which seek inclusion and full participation in the main-
stream of liberal-democratic societies, with access to its education, 
technology, literacy, mass communications, etc. It is equally true of 
most non-immigrant national minorities, like the Québécois, Flemish 
or Catalans4. Some of their members may seek to secede from a li-
beral democracy, but if they do, it is not in order to create an illiberal 
communitarian society, but rather to create their own modern liberal 
democratic society. The Québécois wish to create a “distinct society”, 
but it is a modern, liberal society – with an urbanized, secular, plural-
istic, industrialized, bureaucratized, consumerist mass culture.
Indeed, far from opposing liberal principles, public opinion polls 
show there are no statistical differences between national minorities 
and majorities in their adherence to liberal principles. And immi-
grants also quickly absorb the basic liberal-democratic consensus, 
even when they came from countries with little or no experience of 
liberal democracy5.
As Raz rightly emphasizes, the commitment to individual autono-
my is deep and wide in modern societies, crossing ethnic, linguistic 
and religious lines. To be sure, there are some important – and visible 
– exceptions to this rule. For example, there are a few ethnoreligious 
sects that voluntarily distance themselves from the larger world – the 
Hutterites, Amish, Hasidic Jews. And perhaps some of the more iso-
lated or traditionalist indigenous communities fi t this description as 
“communitarian” groups. The question of how liberal states should 
4  By “national minorities”, I mean groups that formed complete and functioning societies on 
their historic homeland prior to being incorporated into a larger state. The incorporation of such 
national minorities has typically been involuntary, due to colonization, conquest, or the ceding of 
territory from one imperial power to another, but may also arise voluntarily, as a result of federa-
tion. 
5  On the political values of Canadian immigrants, see J. Frideres, “Edging into the Main-
stream: Immigrant Adult and their Children”, in S. Isajiw (ed.), Comparative Perspectives on In-
terethnic Relations and Social Incorporation in Europe and North America, Canadian Scholarʼs 
Press, Toronto 1997, pp. 537-62; for American immigrants, J. Harles, Politics in the Lifeboat: 
Immigrants and the American Democratic Order, Westview Press, Boulder 1993. On the conver-
gence in political values between anglophones and francophones in Canada, see S. Dion, “Le 
Nationalisme dans la Convergence Culturelle”, in R. Hudon-R. Pelletier (eds.), LʼEngagement Intel-
lectuel: Melanges en lʼhonneur de Léon Dion, Les Presses de lʼUniversité Laval, Sainte-Foy 1991. In 
fact, on many issues, national minorities tend to be more liberal than the majority. For example, 
Scots, Québécois and Catalans tend to be more liberal than their majority counterparts on issues 
regarding gay rights, gender equality or foreign aid. See W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: 
Nationalism, Multiculturalism, Citizenship, chaps. 10-15, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001.
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respond to such non-liberal groups is an important one, to which I 
will return.
But the overwhelming majority of debates about minority rights 
within Western democracies are not debates between a liberal majori-
ty and communitarian minorities, but debates amongst liberals about 
the meaning of liberalism. They are debates between individuals and 
groups who endorse the basic liberal-democratic consensus, but who 
disagree about the interpretation of these principles in multiethnic 
societies – in particular, they disagree about the proper role of lan-
guage, nationality, and ethnic identities within liberal-democratic so-
cieties and institutions. Groups claiming minority rights insist that 
certain forms of public recognition for their language, practices and 
identities are not only consistent with basic liberal-democratic princi-
ples, including the importance of individual autonomy, but may
indeed be required by them.
This leads to the second problem with the pre-1989 debate – name-
ly, the assumption that liberal principles are inherently opposed to 
minority rights claims. We now know that things are much more 
complicated, particularly under modern conditions of ethnocultural 
pluralism. We have inherited a set of assumptions about what liberal 
principles require, but these assumptions fi rst emerged in Eighteenth-
century United States, or Nineteenth-century England, where there 
was very little ethnocultural heterogeneity. Virtually all citizens 
shared the same language, ethnic descent, national identity, and 
Christian faith. It is increasingly clear that we cannot rely on the in-
terpretation of liberalism developed in those earlier times. We need to 
judge for ourselves what liberalism requires under our own condi-
tions of ethnocultural pluralism.
This then has led to the second stage of the debate, in which the 
question becomes: what is the possible scope for minority rights 
within liberal theory? Framing the debate this way does not resolve 
the issues. On the contrary, the place of minority rights within liberal 
theory remains very controversial. But it changes the terms of the 
debate. The issue is no longer how to protect communitarian minori-
ties from liberalism, but whether minorities that share basic liberal 
principles nonetheless need minority rights. If groups are indeed libe-
ral, why do they want minority rights? Why arenʼt they satisfi ed with 
the traditional common rights of citizenship?
Raz sʼ 1990 article on national self-determination (co-authored with 
Avishai Margalit) and his 1994 article on multiculturalism are paradigm 
examples of this new approach, and both played a pivotal step in mov-
56 Will Kymlicka
ing the debate forward. Drawing on the account of autonomy developed 
in The Morality of Freedom, Raz insisted that the autonomy of indi-
viduals – their ability to make good choices amongst good lives – is 
intimately tied up with access to their culture, with the prosperity and 
fl ourishing of their culture, and with the respect accorded their culture 
by others. Other liberal writers like David Miller, Yael Tamir and Jeff 
Spinner and myself have developed and elaborated this theme6.
The details of the argument vary, but each of us, in our own way, 
argues that there are compelling interests related to cultural member-
ship and cultural identity, which are fully consistent with liberal prin-
ciples of freedom and equality, and which justify adopting measures 
for «fostering and encouraging the prosperity, cultural and material, 
of cultural groups, and respecting their identity»7. We can call this 
the “liberal culturalist” position, and I think it has quickly become 
the dominant position amongst liberals working in this fi eld8.
Critics of liberal culturalism have raised many objections to this 
entire line of argument: some deny that we can intelligibly distin-
guish or individuate “cultures” or “cultural groups”; others deny that 
we can make sense of the claim that individuals are “members” of 
cultures; yet others say that even if can make sense of the claim that 
individuals are members of distinct cultures, we have no reason to 
assume that the wellbeing of the individual is tied in any way with 
the fl ourishing of the culture9. These are important objections that 
must be answered if liberal culturalism is to properly defended.
However, since I am sympathetic to Razʼs line of argument, I will 
set these objections aside, and assume that there is indeed an impor-
6  Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1993; J. Spinner, The 
Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity and Nationality in the Liberal State, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore 1994; D. Miller, On Nationality, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
1995; W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995.
7  See J. Raz, Multiculturalism, «Ratio Juris», 11/3, 1998, p. 197. Even Charles Taylorʼs ac-
count of the «politics of recognition», which is often described as a “communitarian” position, 
can be seen as a form of “liberal culturalism”, since he too argues that people demand recognition 
of their differences, not instead of individual freedom, but rather as a support and precondition for 
freedom. Cfr. C. Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”, in A. Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism and 
the «Politics of Recognition», Princeton University Press, Princeton 1992, pp. 25-73. However, 
Taylor mixes this liberal argument for multiculturalism with another more communitarian argu-
ment about the intrinsic value of group survival, and his policy recommendations refl ect this hy-
brid mixture of liberal and communitarian reasoning.
8  It is an interesting question why this liberal culturalist view – which is a clear departure from 
the dominant liberal view for several decades – has become so popular so quickly. For some 
speculations, see W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, chap. 2.
9  For a pithy statement of these points, see J. Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmo-
politan Alternative” in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1995, pp. 93-121.
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tant sense in which the wellbeing and autonomy of individuals is tied 
to their cultural membership. This still leaves some diffi cult issues 
even for those who accept the liberal culturalist position. The fi rst 
relates to illiberal minorities. As I noted earlier, there is a small sub-
set of minority groups within Western democracies which seek to 
suppress the autonomy of their members, and such illiberal groups 
would presumably use minority rights almost exclusively for this 
purpose. Second, there are illiberal strands in every culture, even the 
most liberal and democratic, and this raises the worry that some 
forms of minority rights could be misused, even within generally libe-
ral-minded groups, to undermine, rather then support, individual au-
tonomy. Indeed, many liberals have supposed that “group rights” are 
inherently a threat to individual rights. This raises two fundamental 
problems for any liberal theory of minority rights:
a) how should the state respond to the claims of groups which are 
illiberal? Should they be entitled to claim minority rights, or 
should these rights be restricted to groups that have embraced the 
liberal consensus? This is a question about the kinds of groups 
entitled to minority rights;
b) what sort of restrictions or conditions must be set on minority 
rights to ensure that they serve to supplement or strengthen indi-
vidual rights and individual liberty, rather than restrict individual 
rights? This is a question about the kinds of rights that should be 
accorded to groups.
Any liberal theory must address these two questions, and of course 
Raz has done so. To oversimplify, he answers them as follows:
a) Illiberal groups have no claim to support: only groups that respect 
and enable the autonomy of their members deserve support. If il-
liberal groups desire support, they must abandon or neutralize 
their illiberal practices;
b) The key restriction on minority rights is that they must allow for a 
right of exit. Granting rights to (generally liberal) groups is not a 
threat to individual liberty so long as individuals have an effective 
right of exit (which includes knowledge of the options available in 
the larger society, and the general skills needed to succeed in it).
These two answers are controversial, even amongst “liberal cul-
turalists” who are otherwise sympathetic to Razʼs view. Regarding 
the fi rst question, many liberal culturalists would be more generous 
to nonliberal groups, particularly if they are either ethnoreligious 
sects (like the Amish) or indigenous peoples (like the Inuit). In the 
case of groups like the Amish, some authors argue that religious to-
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leration is a distinct liberal value which may sometimes confl ict with, 
and take precedence over, autonomy10. In the case of groups like the 
Inuit, some authors argue that, as conquered or colonized peoples, 
indigenous groups have rights to self-government which predate the 
rise of the state established by colonizing settlers, and that the state 
therefore has not acquired the right to impose liberal norms on them11. 
While Raz implicitly assumes that states have the right to impose 
liberal norms on the indigenous peoples that they have colonized, he 
does not explicitly address the question of how or why this assertion 
of state authority over colonized peoples is legitimate 12.
Regarding the second question of restrictions on minority rights, 
virtually all liberal culturalists would agree that a right of exit is cru-
cial to any liberal theory of minority rights. However, there remain 
disputes about the meaning and preconditions of such a right. Chan-
dran Kukathas, for example, argues that it only requires a formal le-
gal right of exit, and he therefore objects to Razʼs requirement that 
the children of minority groups must learn a core curriculum, na-
tional language or set of general skills 13.
Okin, on the other hand, insists that a truly effective right of exit, 
particularly for women, requires not only formal rights and minimal 
education, but also active state intervention to eliminate sexist cul-
tural practices and stereotypes which make it diffi cult or impossible 
for women to leave a community, even when they are oppressed 
within it14. She argues that Razʼs account of a right of exit is there-
fore too weak.
Much more could be said about these two questions. I have quib-
bles with Razʼs answers to these questions, but I will not pursue them 
here. Instead, I want to raise a more general concern about the frame-
10  J. Spinner, The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity and Nationality in the Liberal 
State, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1994; W. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 
«Ethics», 105/3, 1995, pp. 516-34. This is particularly likely to be the view of those who endorse 
a more “political” conception of liberalism, in Rawlsʼs sense, rather than the more “comprehen-
sive” conception that Raz adopts (and I share).
11  J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge 1995. Note that neither of these arguments applies to the (non-religious) 
practices of voluntary immigrants. In such cases, most liberal culturalists agree with Raz that it is 
appropriate for the state to insist on respect for liberal norms. This would apply to many contro-
versial issues regarding immigrant groups, such as female circumcision or forced arranged mar-
riages. 
12  J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1986, pp. 423-24.
13  C. Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, in I. Shapiro-W. Kymlicka (eds.) «Ethnicity and Group 
Rights: NOMOS», 39, NYU Press, New York 1997, pp. 69-104. 
14  S. Okin, Mistresses of their own Destiny? Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit, 
presented at the annual meeting of the “American Political Science Association”, Sept. 1998.
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work underlying this second stage of the debate, including Razʼs con-
tributions. To recap, in this second stage, the question of minority 
rights is reformulated as a question within liberal theory, and the aim 
is to show that some (but not all) minority rights claims actually en-
hance liberal values. In my opinion, this second stage refl ects genu-
ine progress. We now have a better understanding of the claims being 
made by ethnocultural groups, and of the normative issues they raise. 
We have moved beyond the sterile and misleading debate about indi-
vidualism and collectivism.
However, I think this second stage also needs to be questioned. 
While it incorporates a more accurate understanding of the nature of 
most ethnocultural groups, and the demands they place on the liberal 
state, it misinterprets the nature of the liberal state, and the demands 
it places on minorities.
3. A Third Stage? Minority Rights as a Response to Nation-Building
Let me explain. The assumption – generally shared by both de-
fenders and critics of minority rights, though not by Raz himself – is 
that the liberal state, in its normal operation, abides by a principle of 
ethnocultural neutrality. That is, the state is “neutral” with respect to 
the ethnocultural identities of its citizens, and indifferent to the abili-
ty of ethnocultural groups to reproduce themselves over time. On this 
view, liberal states treat culture in the same way as religion - i.e., as 
something which people should be free to pursue in their private 
lives, but which is not the concern of the state (so long as they re-
spect the rights of others). Just as liberalism precludes the establish-
ment of an offi cial religion, so too there cannot be offi cial cultures 
that have preferred status over other possible cultural allegiances15.
Indeed, some theorists argue that this is precisely what distin-
guishes liberal “civic nations” from illiberal “ethnic nations”16. Eth-
nic nations take the reproduction of a particular ethnonational culture 
and identity as one of their most important goals. Civic nations, by 
contrast, are “neutral” with respect to the ethnocultural identities of 
their citizens, and defi ne national membership purely in terms of ad-
herence to certain principles of democracy and justice. For minorities 
to seek special rights, on this view, is a departure from the traditional 
15  M. Walzer, “Comment”, in A. Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism and the «Politics of Recogni-
tion», pp. 100-01.
16  M. Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux (eds.), New York 1993.
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operation of the liberal state. Therefore, the burden of proof lies on 
anyone who would wish to endorse such minority rights.
This is the burden of proof which liberal culturalists try to meet 
with their account of the importance of cultural membership in securi-
ng individual autonomy and self-respect. Liberal culturalists try to 
show that minority rights supplement, rather than diminish, individu-
al freedom and equality, and help to meet legitimate interests that 
would otherwise go unmet in a state that clung rigidly to ethnocul-
tural neutrality.
The presumption in the second stage of the debate has been that 
advocates of minority rights must demonstrate compelling reasons to 
depart from the norm of ethnocultural neutrality. This is not the way 
Raz himself describes the issue – he has never accepted that liberal 
states are or can be ethnoculturally neutral – but even he seems to 
accept that the burden of proof falls on those who seek to deviate 
from “difference-blind” institutions or procedures17.
I would argue, however, that the idea that liberal-democratic states 
(or “civic nations”) are ethnoculturally neutral is manifestly false, 
both historically and conceptually. The religion model is altogether 
misleading as an account of the relationship between the liberal-demo-
cratic state and ethnocultural groups. Once we abandon this model, 
and adopt a more accurate conception of the liberal state, we will 
also have to rethink our theory of minority rights, and address a range 
of issues not present in Razʼs theory.
Why is the ethnocultural neutrality model inaccurate? Consider 
the actual policies of the United States, which is often cited as the 
prototypically “neutral” state. Historically, decisions about the bounda-
ries of state governments, and the timing of their admission into the 
federation, were deliberately made to ensure that anglophones would 
be a majority within each of the fi fty states of the American federa-
tion. This helped establish the dominance of English throughout the 
territory of the United States. And the continuing dominance of En-
glish is ensured by several ongoing policies. For example, it is a legal 
requirement for children to learn the English language in schools; it 
is a legal requirement for immigrants (under the age of 50) to learn 
the English language to acquire American citizenship; and it is a de 
facto requirement for government employment that the applicant 
speak English.
17  See his discussion of the “why multiculturalism?” question in J. Raz, Multiculturalism, cit., 
p. 200.
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These decisions about the drawing of internal boundaries, the lan-
guage of education and government employment, and the require-
ments of citizenship are profoundly important. They are not isolated 
exceptions to some norm of ethnocultural neutrality. On the contrary, 
they have shaped the very structure of the American state and of 
American society.
These policies have been pursued with the intention of promoting 
the integration of American citizens into what I call a “societal cul-
ture”. By a societal culture, I mean a territorially-concentrated cul-
ture, centred on a shared language which is used in a wide range of 
societal institutions, in both public and private life (schools, media, 
law, economy, government, etc.). I call it a “societal” culture to em-
phasize that it involves a common language and social institutions, 
rather than common religious beliefs, family customs or personal 
lifestyles. Societal cultures within a modern liberal democracy are 
inevitably pluralistic, containing Christians as well as Muslims, Jews 
and atheists; heterosexuals as well as gays; urban professionals as 
well as rural farmers; conservatives as well as socialists. Such diver-
sity is the inevitable result of the rights and freedoms guaranteed to 
liberal citizens – including freedom of conscience, association, 
speech, political dissent and rights to privacy – particularly when 
combined with an ethnically diverse population. This diversity, how-
ever, is balanced and constrained by linguistic and institutional cohe-
sion; cohesion that has not emerged on its own, but rather is the re-
sult of deliberate state policies.
The American government has deliberately created and sustained 
such a societal culture: it has systematically promoted a common lan-
guage, and a sense of common membership in, and equal access to, the 
social institutions operating in that language. It has encouraged citizens 
to view their life-chances as tied up with participation in common so-
cietal institutions that operate in the English language, and nurtured a 
national identity defi ned in part by this common membership in a so-
cietal culture. Nor is the Unites States unique in this respect. Promot-
ing integration of citizens into a societal culture is part of a “nation-
building” project that all liberal democracies have engaged in.
Obviously, the sense in which English-speaking Americans share 
a common “culture” is a very thin one, since it does not preclude dif-
ferences in religion, personal values, family relationships or lifestyle 
choices. But it is far from trivial. On the contrary, as I discuss below, 
attempts to integrate people into such a common societal culture have 
often faced serious resistance. Although integration in this sense 
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leaves a great deal of room for both the public and private expression 
of individual and collective differences, some groups have nonethe-
less rejected the idea that they should integrate into a common soci-
etal culture, and view their life-chances as tied up with the societal 
institutions conducted in the majorityʼs language.
So we need to replace the idea of an “ethnoculturally neutral” state 
with a new model of a liberal democratic state – what I call the “na-
tion-building” model. To say that states are nation-building is not to 
say that governments can only promote one societal culture. It is pos-
sible for government policies to encourage the sustaining of two or 
more societal cultures within a single country – indeed, as I discuss 
below, this is precisely what characterizes multination states like 
Switzerland, Belgium, Spain or Canada.
However, historically, virtually all liberal democracies have, at one 
point or another, attempted to diffuse a single societal culture through-
out all of its territory18. Nor should this be seen purely as a matter of 
cultural imperialism or ethnocentric prejudice. Nation-building serves 
a number of important liberal-democratic goals. For example, a mo-
dern economy requires a mobile, educated and literate workforce. 
Standardized public education in a common language has often been 
seen as essential if all citizens are to have equal opportunity to work 
in this modern economy. Also, participation in a common societal cul-
ture has often been seen as essential for generating the sort of solidari-
ty required by a welfare state, since it promotes a sense of common 
national identity and membership. Moreover, a common language has 
been seen as essential to democracy – how can “the people” govern 
together if they cannot understand one another? In short, promoting 
integration into a common societal culture has been seen as essential 
to promoting social equality and political cohesion in modern states.
Indeed, one could argue that the only sort of liberal democracy 
that exists in the world has arisen through efforts to create liberalized 
societal cultures. Liberal reformers have generally, if implicitly, ac-
cepted that the relevant unit or context within which to pursue liberal 
principles of freedom and equality is societal cultures consolidated 
by state nation-building policies. In this sense, as Tamir puts it, «most 
liberals are liberal nationalists»19.
18  To my knowledge, Switzerland is perhaps the only exception: it never made any serious 
attempt to pressure its French- and Italian-speaking minorities to integrate into the German majori-
ty. All of the other contemporary Western multination states have at one time or another made a 
concerted effort to assimilate their minorities, and only reluctantly gave up this ideal.
19  Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p.139.
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Of course, nation-building can also be used to promote illiberal 
goals. As Margaret Canovan puts it, nationhood is like a «battery» 
which makes states run – the existence of a common national iden-
tity motivates and mobilizes citizens to act for common political 
goals – and these goals can be liberal or illiberal20.
The «battery» of nationalism can be used to promote liberal goals 
(such as social justice, democratization, equality of opportunity, eco-
nomic development) or illiberal goals (chauvinism, xenophobia, mili-
tarism, and unjust conquest). The fact that the «battery» of nationalism 
can be used for so many functions helps to explain why it has been so 
ubiquitous. Liberal reformers invoke nationhood to mobilize citizens 
behind projects of democratization and social justice (e.g., comprehen-
sive health care or public schooling); illiberal authoritarians invoke na-
tionhood to mobilize citizens behind attacks on alleged enemies of the 
nation, be they foreign countries or internal dissidents. This is why na-
tion-building is just as common in authoritarian regimes in the West as 
in democracies. Consider Spain under Franco, or Greece or Latin 
America under the military dictators. Authoritarian regimes also need 
a «battery» to help achieve public objectives in complex modern socie-
ties. What distinguishes liberal from illiberal states is not the presence 
or absence of nation-building, but rather the ends to which nation-
building is put, and the means used in pursuit of nation-building.
So states have engaged in this process of “nation-building”21. De-
cisions regarding offi cial languages, core curriculum in education, 
and the requirements for acquiring citizenship, all have been made 
with the express intention of diffusing a particular societal culture 
throughout the territory of the state, and of promoting a national 
identity based on participation in that societal culture.
If this nation-building model provides a more accurate account of 
the nature of modern liberal democratic states than the ethnocultural 
neutrality model, how does this affect the issue of minority rights? I 
believe it gives us a very different perspective on the debate. In par-
ticular, it changes the burden of proof. As I noted earlier, during the 
second stage of the debate both advocates and critics of minority 
rights tended to assume that the onus was on advocates to show com-
pelling reasons why states should deviate from ethnocultural neutrali-
ty. Once we recognize that states are not ethnoculturally neutral, but 
20  M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 1996. 
21  For the ubiquity of this process, see E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell, Ox-
ford 1983; B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Refl ections on the Origin and Spread of Nationa-
lism, New Left Books, London 1983.
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rather engage in the promotion and diffusion of a dominant societal 
culture, then we must ask whether these nation-building policies cre-
ate injustices for minorities. The burden of proof falls on the state to 
show that minority rights are not required to remedy or counteract 
injustices which arise from state nation-building.
This would be a new approach to the debate, which I am trying to 
develop in my own recent work. I cannot explore all of its implica-
tions, but let me give two examples of how this new model of the 
liberal state may affect the debate over minority rights. I will fi rst try 
to develop this new model in my own terms (section 4), and then 
consider the extent to which this new model requires revising or ex-
panding Razʼs account (section 5).
4. Two Examples
How does nation-building affect minorities? As Charles Taylor 
notes, the process of nation-building inescapably privileges members 
of the majority culture:
If a modern society has an “offi cial” language, in the fullest sense of the term, 
that is, a state-sponsored, – inculcated and defi ned – language and culture, in which 
both economy and state function, then it is obviously an immense advantage to 
people if this language and culture are theirs. Speakers of other languages are at a 
distinct disadvantage22.
This means that the members of minority cultures face a choice. If 
all public institutions are being run in another language, minorities 
face the danger of being marginalized from the major economic, aca-
demic, and political institutions of the society. Faced with this di-
lemma, minorities have (to oversimplify) three basic options:
I) they can accept integration into the majority culture, although 
perhaps attempt to renegotiate the terms of integration;
II) they can seek the sorts of rights and powers of self-government 
needed to maintain their own societal culture – i.e., to create 
their own economic, political and educational institutions in their 
own language;
III) they can accept permanent marginalization.
We can fi nd some ethnocultural groups that fi t each of these catego-
ries (and other groups that are caught between them). For example, 
22  C. Taylor, “Nationalism and Modernity”, in J. McMahan-R. McKim (eds.), The Ethics of 
Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997, p. 34. 
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some immigrant groups choose permanent marginalization. This is 
true, for example, of the Hutterites in Canada, or the Amish in the 
United States. But the option of accepting marginalization is only like-
ly to be attractive to ethnoreligious groups whose theology requires 
them to avoid all contact with the modern world. The Hutterites and 
Amish are unconcerned about their marginalization from universities 
or legislatures, since they view such “worldly” institutions as corrupt.
Virtually all other ethnocultural minorities, however, seek to par-
ticipate in the modern world, and to do so, they must either integrate 
or seek the self-government needed to create and sustain their own 
modern institutions. Faced with this choice, ethnocultural groups 
have responded in different ways.
National Minorities: National minorities have typically responded 
to majority nation-building by engaging in their own competing na-
tion-building. Indeed, they often use the same tools that the majority 
uses to promote this nation-building – e.g., control over the language 
and curriculum of schooling, the language of government employ-
ment, the requirements of immigration and naturalization, and the 
drawing of internal boundaries. We can see this clearly in the case of 
Québécois nationalism, which has largely been concerned with gain-
ing and exercising these nation-building powers. The same is true of 
Flemish or Catalan nationalism. But it is also increasingly true of 
indigenous peoples in various parts of the world, who have adopted 
the language of “nationhood” and “nation-building”23.
Intuitively, the adoption of such minority nation-building projects 
seems fair. If the majority can engage in legitimate nation-building, 
why not national minorities, particularly those which have been in-
voluntarily incorporated into a larger state? To be sure, liberal princi-
ples set limits on how national groups, whether majority or minority, 
go about nation-building. Liberal principles preclude any attempts at 
ethnic cleansing, or stripping people of their citizenship, or the viola-
tion of human rights. These principles will also insist that any na-
tional group engaged in a project of nation-building must respect the 
right of other nations within its jurisdiction to protect and build their 
own national institutions. For example, the Québécois are entitled to 
assert national rights vis-a-vis the rest of Canada, but only if they 
respect the rights of Aboriginals within Quebec to assert national 
rights vis-a-vis the rest of Quebec.
23  G. Alfred, Heeding the Voices of our Ancestors: Kahnawake Mohawk Politics and the Rise of 
Native Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Toronto 1995. 
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These limits are important, but they still leave signifi cant room, I 
believe, for legitimate forms of minority nationalism. Moreover, these 
limits are likely to be similar for both majority and minority nations. 
All else being equal, national minorities should have the same tools 
of nation-building available to them as the majority nation, subject to 
the same liberal limitations.
What we need, in other words, is a consistent theory of permissi-
ble forms of nation-building within liberal democracies. I do not 
think that political theorists have yet developed such a theory. One of 
the many unfortunate side-effects of the dominance of the “ethnocul-
tural neutrality” model of the liberal state is that liberal theorists have 
never explicitly confronted this question.
I do not have a fully developed theory about the permissible forms 
of nation-building24. My aim here is not to promote any particular 
theory of permissible nation-building, but simply to insist that this is 
the relevant question we need to address. That is, the question is not 
“have national minorities given us a compelling reason to abandon 
the norm of ethnocultural neutrality?”, but rather “why should na-
tional minorities not have the same powers of nation-building as the 
majority?”. This is the context within which minority nationalism 
must be evaluated – i.e., as a response to majority nation-building, 
using the same tools of nation-building. And the burden of proof 
surely rests on those who would deny to national minorities the pow-
ers of nation-building which the national majority takes for granted.
Immigrants: Historically, nation-building has not neither desirable 
nor feasible for immigrant groups. Instead, they have traditionally 
accepted the expectation that they will integrate into the larger soci-
etal culture. Indeed, few immigrant groups in any Western democracy 
have objected to the requirement that they must learn an offi cial lan-
guage as a condition of citizenship, or that their children must learn 
the offi cial language in school. They have accepted the assumption 
that their life-chances, and even more the life-chances of their chil-
dren, will be bound up with participation in mainstream institutions 
operating in the majority language.
However, this is not to say that immigrants do not suffer injustices 
as a result of nation-building policies. After all, the state is not neu-
tral with respect to the language and culture of immigrants: it im-
24  I offer guidelines for distinguishing liberal and illiberal forms of nation-building in W. 
Kymlicka-M. Opalski Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic 
Relations in Eastern Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001.
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poses a range of de jure and de facto requirements for immigrants to 
integrate in order to succeed. These requirements are often diffi cult 
and costly for immigrants to meet. Since immigrants cannot respond 
to this by adopting their own nation-building programs, but rather 
must attempt to integrate as best they can, it is only fair that the state 
minimize the costs involved in this state-demanded integration.
Put another way, immigrants can demand fairer terms of integra-
tion. If a country is going to pressure immigrants to integrate into 
common institutions operating in the majority language, then it must 
ensure that the terms of integration are fair. To my mind, this demand 
has two basic elements:
a) we need to recognize that integration does not occur overnight, 
but is a diffi cult and long-term process which operates inter-gene-
rationally. This means that special accommodations are often re-
quired for immigrants on a transitional basis. For example, certain 
services should be available in the immigrants  ʼ mother tongue, 
and support should be provided for those organizations and groups 
within immigrant communities which assist in the settlement and 
integration process;
b) we need to ensure that the common institutions into which immi-
grants are pressured to integrate provide the same degree of re-
spect, recognition and accommodation of the identities and prac-
tices of immigrants as they traditionally have of the identities of 
the majority group.
This requires a systematic exploration of our social institutions to 
see whether their rules, structures and symbols disadvantage immi-
grants. For example, we need to examine dress-codes, public holi-
days, or even height and weight restrictions to see whether they are 
biased against certain immigrant groups. We also need to examine 
the portrayal of minorities in school curricula or the media to see if 
they are stereotypical, or fail to recognize the contributions of ethno-
cultural groups to national history or world culture. And so on. These 
measures are needed to ensure that liberal states are offering immi-
grants fair terms of integration25.
Others may disagree with the fairness of some of these policies. 
The requirements of fairness are not obvious, particularly in the con-
text of people who have chosen to enter a country, and political theo-
rists have done little to illuminate the issue. Here again, the domi-
25  W. Kymlicka, Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada, Oxford 
University Press, Toronto 1998, chap. 3. 
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nance of the “ethnocultural neutrality” model of the liberal state has 
blinded liberal theorists to the importance of the question. My aim 
here is not to promote a particular theory of fair terms of integration, 
but rather to insist that this is the relevant question we need to ad-
dress. The question is not whether immigrants have given us a com-
pelling reason to diverge from the norm of ethnocultural neutrality, 
but rather how can we ensure that state policies aimed at pressuring 
immigrants to integrate are fair?
I believe that we could extend this method to look at other types 
of ethnocultural groups that are neither national minorities nor im-
migrants, such as African-Americans, the Roma in Central Europe, 
or Russian settlers in the Baltics. In each case, I think it is possible 
– and indeed essential – to view their claims to minority rights as a 
response to perceived injustices that arise out of nation-building poli-
cies26. Each groupʼs claims can be seen as specifying the injustices 
that majority nation-building has imposed on them, and as identify-
ing the conditions under which majority nation-building would cease 
to be unjust.
If we combine these different demands into a larger conception of 
ethnocultural justice, we can say that majority nation-building in a 
liberal-democracy is legitimate under the following conditions:
a) nation-building is inclusive: i.e., no groups of long-term residents 
are permanently excluded from membership in the nation. Every-
one living on the territory must be able to gain citizenship, and 
become an equal member of the nation if they wish to do so. This 
condition responds to and remedies the injustice which groups 
such as metics or racial caste have faced as a result of nation-
building in many Western democracies;
b) the concept of national identity and integration must be pluralistic 
and tolerant: i.e., the sort of sociocultural integration which is re-
quired for membership in the nation should be understood in a 
“thin” sense, primarily involving institutional and linguistic inte-
gration, not the adoption of any particular set of customs, religious 
beliefs, or lifestyles. Integration into common institutions operat-
ing in a common language should still leave maximal room for the 
expression of individual and collective differences, both in public 
and private, and public institutions should be adapted to accom-
modate the identity and practices of ethnocultural minorities. This 
26  I explore the claims of these other types of groups in W. Kymlicka-M. Opalski, Can Lib-
eral Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe.
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condition responds to and remedies the injustice that many immi-
grant groups have faced as a result of nation-building;
c) all national groups within a state, not just the majority nation, are 
allowed to engage in their own nation-building, to enable them to 
maintain themselves as distinct societal cultures. This condition 
responds to and remedies the injustice that many national minori-
ties have faced as a result of nation-building.
These three conditions have rarely been met within Western de-
mocracies, but we can see a clear trend within most democracies to-
wards greater acceptance of them. And I think that the major task 
facing any liberal theory of multiculturalism is to better understand 
these conditions of ethnocultural justice, by showing how particular 
minority rights claims are related to, and a response to, state nation-
building policies.
5. Raz on Nationalism and Nation-Building
How does this relate to Razʼs theory? At one level, I think that 
there is no inherent confl ict between Razʼs approach and the one that 
I have just sketched. Indeed, his account of appropriate multicultural-
ism policies for immigrant groups27, and his account of the rights of 
national groups to self-determination, can easily be (re)described in 
the terms I have just outlined.
For examine, consider his list of multicultural policies which im-
migrant groups can rightly seek:
– While children should be educated to be familiar with the history and traditions of 
the dominant culture of the country, they should also be educated in the culture 
of their group, if their parents so desire;
– The customs and practices of different groups, within the limits of permissible 
toleration, should be recognized;
– The link between poverty, under-education and ethnicity should be dissolved;
– There should be generous public support for cultural institutions (museums, 
theatre etc.);
– Public space should accommodate all cultural groups.28
Each of these policies can be redescribed, I believe, as helping to 
ensure fairer terms of integration into the dominant societal culture 
of a new country.
27  J. Raz, Multiculturalism.
28  Ivi, pp. 198-99.
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Similarly, Razʼs account of the right of self-determination for na-
tional groups can be seen as a defense of the right of national mi-
norities to engage in a range of nation-building policies so as to 
maintain their distinct societal cultures, with their own public institu-
tions operating in their own language29.
So most or all of what Raz says regarding the substantive rights of 
immigrants and national minorities is consistent with the sort of model 
I am advancing. His account can be seen as putting fl esh on the skel-
etal framework that I have outlined; conversely, my framework can be 
seen as providing further support for his substantive claims about the 
legitimate claims of immigrants and national minorities.
However, at another level, Razʼs account is in some tension with 
mine. For he insists that his conception of multiculturalism requires 
not only this or that substantive policy for this or that group, but also 
a complete revision in our very understanding of the nation-state. In 
particular, he argues that multiculturalism «calls on us to radically to 
reconceive society, changing its self-image», in two respects:
a) it requires that «we should learn to think of our societies as con-
sisting not of a majority and minorities, but as constituted by a 
plurality of cultural groups»30. Indeed, he says that multicultural-
ism is primarily a matter of such a change in self-image, rather 
than of specifi c policies31.
b) it also calls on us to «replace the ideology of nationalism», and 
«reject common nationality as the common bond on which politi-
cal units must be based»32.
Itʼs important to note that my conception of minority rights does 
not involve either of these two claims, and in a certain sense rejects 
both. First, the whole point of my approach is precisely to emphasize 
the extent to which most liberal democratic societies do consist of a 
majority, which uses state power to engage in nation-building, and 
various minorities, who then have to decide how to respond to these 
nation-building policies. If there were no majority, and hence no ma-
jority nation-building, we could not think of minority rights as a re-
sponse to the potential injustices of majority nation-building.
Indeed, I would argue that the major advances in thinking about 
multiculturalism and minority rights in the past decade have arisen 
29  A. Margalit-J. Raz, National Self-Determination, «Journal of Philosophy», 87/9, 1990, pp. 
439-61. 
30  J. Raz, Multiculturalism, p. 197.
31  Ivi, p. 200.
32  Ivi, p. 196 and p. 202.
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precisely out of an awareness of the pervasiveness and signifi cance 
of majority/minority relations – i.e., an awareness of the benefi ts ac-
crued by majorities in majoritarian, nation-building states, and the 
subsequent pressures and disadvantages faced by minorities. It is of-
ten the critics of multiculturalism, at least in the North American 
context, who say that we donʼt have a (privileged) majority and (dis-
advantaged) minorities, and therefore donʼt need multiculturalism 
policies.
Perhaps Raz would agree that contemporary societies can only be 
understood through the lens of majority/minority dynamics, but 
would insist that the point of multiculturalism would be to eliminate 
these dynamics. This then leads us to Razʼs second claim: namely, 
that multiculturalism challenges nationalism, and the privileging of 
national identities as the locus of political community. Iʼm not sure 
what precisely Raz means by this, but one obvious interpretation 
would be to say that multiculturalism challenges the very legitimacy 
of state nation-building policies, and seeks to prevent majorities from 
using state power to promote the integration of citizens into common 
societal cultures.
If this is what Raz means (and Iʼm not sure it is), then I think it is 
problematic, both empirically and normatively. Empirically, I see no 
evidence that either immigrants or national minorities are challeng-
ing the basic legitimacy of nation-building policies, or the legitimacy 
of states trying to integrate citizens into societal cultures. It is obvi-
ous that national minorities are not challenging this, since the whole 
aim of minority nationalism is precisely to gain these nation-building 
powers for themselves, and to use these same powers to consolidate 
their own societal culture in their own region of the country. They are 
insisting that they live in multination states, in which two or more 
national groups are able to exercise nation-building powers on a re-
gional basis. This insistence that they live in a multination state is, in 
one sense, a challenge to the traditional ideal of a (mono-national) 
“nation-state”. But a multination state is not a postnational state: it is 
still organized along national lines, and still asserts that national 
groups have the right to self-government – i.e., to form their own 
autonomous political communities within the larger state. It therefore 
accepts the legitimacy of nationalism as an ideology, and accepts that 
nations form a basic context of liberal political community33.
33  For evidence that the claims of national minorities are indeed driven by nationalism, see M. 
Keating-J. McGarry Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford 2001.
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It might seem that the claims of immigrants are more of a chal-
lenge to the legitimacy of nation-building. But in fact the vast major-
ity of immigrants also accept the validity of nation-building. For ex-
ample, as I noted earlier, few immigrant groups in any Western de-
mocracy have objected to the requirement that they must learn an 
offi cial language as a condition of citizenship, or that their children 
must learn the offi cial language in school. They have accepted the 
assumption that their life-chances, and even more the life-chances of 
their children, will be bound up with participation in mainstream in-
stitutions operating in the majority language. What they are seeking 
is fair terms of integration into the dominant societal culture.
So far as I can tell, therefore, neither immigrants nor national mi-
norities are challenging the centrality of national cultures and national 
identities to political life, or the legitimacy of using state power to 
consolidate these national cultures and identities.
Iʼm not sure whether Raz really disagrees with any of this. After 
all, he agrees that immigrants should learn a «common culture», in 
part through a «common education»34 which includes knowledge of 
the basic skills required to have equal opportunity in the economy 
and to participate in mainstream political life. It is diffi cult to see 
what this could possibly mean other than the sort of linguistic and 
institutional integration into a common societal culture that has been 
the aim of traditional nation-building policies. How else could im-
migrants achieve economic equality of opportunity except by know-
ing the dominant language, and participating in integrated institutions 
of higher education conducted in the dominant language? Indeed, 
how would we measure equality of opportunity except by seeing 
whether immigrants are succeeding in such institutions? And how 
else can they participate in politics?
Given Razʼs call for a common culture and a common education, 
and for equality of opportunity in economics and politics, it is quite 
possible that he endorses much if not all of what I have been calling 
“nation-building” policies. Perhaps we simply disagree about whether 
to use the terms “nationalism” and “nation-building”. Perhaps he 
thinks that if liberal states allow national minorities to be self-go-
verning, and allow immigrants to integrate rather than assimilate, 
then they have distanced themselves so far from traditional forms of 
nationalism that it is tantamount to «rejecting the ideology of nation-
alism».
34  J. Raz, Multiculturalism, p. 202 and p. 203.
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If this is his view, then our dispute is merely semantic. In my 
view, if liberal states accord rights of self-government to national 
groups, and pressure immigrants to integrate linguistically and insti-
tutionally into the societal culture of host nation, then liberal states 
are still very much imbued with the ideology of nationalism. To be 
sure, this is a distinctive form of nationalism: it is, in fact, a distinc-
tively liberal form of nationalism. Indeed, one way to defi ne liberal 
nationalism is precisely that it accepts the legitimacy of minority na-
tionalism and of immigrant multiculturalism. But this is still nationa-
lism, and it still involves nation-building, both by the state and by 
national minorities.
But our dispute may not be purely semantic. Perhaps Iʼve put too 
much weight on Razʼs brief references to «common culture» and 
«common education». Perhaps he only means by this that the state 
can require minimal levels of knowledge (e.g., of oneʼs rights, or of 
mathematics) but not any sort of linguistic or institutional integra-
tion. Perhaps he really does think that it is impermissible for the state 
(or national minorities) to engage in nation-building, or to seek to 
integrate immigrants linguistically and institutionally into a societal 
culture. If so, then I think he is going far beyond the actual demands 
of most minorities in Western democracies. Moreover, Iʼm not sure 
what sorts of rights minorities would have in such a non-national or 
post-national state. Imagine that the liberal state rejected nation-
building policies, and abandoned the goal of the linguistic or institu-
tional integration of citizens. Would national minorities still have 
rights to self-determination? Would immigrants still have the right to 
inclusion and representation in public media or school curriculum? 
Or would it be enough to simply ensure that minorities have rights of 
non-discrimination in the distribution of public funds?
Raz insists that multiculturalism isnʼt simply a matter of non-dis-
crimination, and I agree. But on my view, part of the reason why 
justice requires more than non-discrimination is that liberal states are 
nation-building states. For example, it is because states are nation-
building that justice requires granting comparable nation-building 
powers to national minorities. If majorities never used state power to 
pressure national minorities into integrating into majority institutions, 
then national minorities wouldnʼt have the same need to control their 
own levers of state power. Whether national minorities need rights of 
regional self-government depends, in least in part, on the prior ques-
tion of whether the majority is prone to using centralized power to 
promote nation-building.
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Similarly, it is at least partly because states pressure immigrants to 
integrate linguistically and institutionally that immigrants have a right 
to respect and accommodation within the institutions that they are 
being pressured to integrate into. If majorities werenʼt pressuring im-
migrants to integrate into common public institutions in the dominant 
language – if, for example, immigrants didnʼt have to learn the do-
minant language to become citizens, or to have their professional 
qualifi cations recognized – then they would have a weaker claim to 
accommodation within majority institutions.
To be sure, both immigrants and national minorities would have 
certain claims to respect and accommodation even in such a non-na-
tional state. But it is likely, I believe, that in a world where majorities 
renounced their nation-building projects, minorities would also have 
to give up many of their claims to multiculturalism and minority 
rights. In my view, these are two sides of the same coin: the legiti-
macy of minority rights depends, at least in part, on the legitimacy of 
nation-building. I would defend a robust set of minority rights, not 
because nation-building is illegitimate, but precisely because it is le-
gitimate. I believe it is legitimate for states to engage in robust forms 
of nation-building – nation-building is necessary to achieve liberal 
values of freedom and equality in complex modern societies – and 
just for that reason, we must also defend a robust set of minority 
rights, in order to remedy any inequalities which might arise as a 
result of (legitimate) nation-building policies.
Razʼs claim that liberal multiculturalism involves «learning to 
think of our societies as consisting not of a majority and minorities, 
but as constituted by a plurality of cultural groups»35 sounds attrac-
tive at fi rst glance, but I think it is actually a more accurate descrip-
tion of preliberal and premodern societies than of liberal democra-
cies. In the past, multiethnic empires were often content to simply let 
a plurality of groups alone, so long as they paid their taxes or trib-
utes, obeyed the laws, and co-existed peacefully with other ethnic 
groups. No one group tried to use state power to consolidate or dif-
fuse its language and culture as the societal culture for all citizens. 
Today, however, few states around the world are content with this 
sort of co-existence. They want groups to exhibit a stronger sense of 
identifi cation or loyalty with the state, so that they will actively par-
ticipate and cooperate in the projects of the state, be they militaristic 
wars, economic modernization, or social justice. And to gain the ac-
35  Ivi, p. 197.
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tive support of citizens, states around the world have adopted nation-
building programs which aim to turn co-subjects, bound only loosely 
to each other by certain common laws and taxes, into co-nationals, 
who share a strong bond in virtue of a common national identity and 
a common commitment to national projects.
I suspect that this historical shift from multiethnic empires to na-
tion-building states was necessary for liberalization and democratiza-
tion. The consolidation of liberal democracy required shifting from 
the earlier model of society as a loose plurality of cultural groups to 
a modern model of a nation-building state in which the majority at-
tempts to diffuse its national language and culture throughout the 
state. And in my view, current demands for self-government by na-
tional minorities and for multiculturalism by immigrant groups do 
not represent a rejection of that basic shift, but rather an attempt to 
remedy the injustices which accompanied it. Far from rejecting or 
repudiating the legitimacy of nation-building, they are intended pre-
cisely to create the qualifi cations and conditions under which it is 
legitimate. As I said earlier, these conditions can be summarized as:
a) there are no groups of long-term residents which are permanently 
excluded from membership in the nation, such as metics or racial 
caste groups;
b) the sort of sociocultural integration which is required for member-
ship in the nation should be understood in a “thin” sense, primarily 
involving institutional and linguistic integration, not the adoption 
of any particular set of customs, religious beliefs, or lifestyles;
c) national minorities are allowed to engage in their own nation-
building, to enable them to maintain themselves as distinct soci-
etal cultures.
So far as I can tell, none of these claims repudiate the necessity or 
legitimacy of majority nation-building. Rather, they presuppose the 
historical shift away from the model of society as a loose plurality of 
groups towards a model of a nation-building state, and seek only to 
ensure that this shift is not unfair to minorities.
Perhaps Raz thinks that nation-building was not needed to secure 
democratization, mass participation and equality of opportunity. Or 
perhaps he thinks that while it was needed in the past, it is no longer 
necessary, and that we can give up nation-building without reverting 
to this older predemocratic model of the (mere) coexistence of a plu-
rality of groups. Or perhaps he only rejects the term, rather than the 
substance, of nation-building. Clarifying these issues will help deter-
mine the extent to which Razʼs theory differs from other emerging 
theories of liberal multiculturalism.
